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Trade negotiators and policy advisors are keen to know the relative contribution of 
different farm policy instruments to international trade and economic welfare. 
Nominal rates of assistance or producer support estimates are incomplete indicators, 
especially when (especially in developing countries) some commodities are taxed and 
others are subsidized in which case positive contributions can offset negative 
contributions. This paper develops and estimates a new set of more-satisfactory 
indicators to examine the relative contribution of different farm policy instruments to 
reductions in agricultural trade and welfare, drawing on recent literature on trade 
restrictiveness indexes and a recently compiled database on distortions to agricultural 
prices for 75 developing and high-income countries over the period 1960 to 2004. 
Results confirm earlier findings that border taxes are the dominant instrument 
affecting global trade and welfare, but they also suggest declines in export taxes 
contributed nearly as much as cuts in import protection to global welfare gains from 
agricultural policy reforms since the 1980s. 
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Changing contributions of different agricultural policy 
instruments to global reductions in trade and welfare 
 
 
The relative contribution of different policy instruments to reductions in trade and 
welfare are of interest to (a) trade negotiators as a way of prioritizing their negotiating 
efforts, and (b) agricultural policy analysts as a way of pointing to the inefficiencies in 
governments’ choices of policy measures. This has been the subject of particular 
interest during the Doha round of World Trade organization (WTO) negotiations, 
especially the relative importance of high-income country agricultural subsidies 
versus import market access restrictions (Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 2006). 
In comparing across policy instruments economists commonly calculate 
weighted averages of the nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) or consumer tax 
equivalents (CTEs) for various products of different policy instruments. However, 
aggregates of NRAs and CTEs for different instruments are not able to capture 
accurately the relative contribution of those different instruments to trade and welfare 
reductions. This is especially so when some policies (such as import taxes) have 
negative effects on trade while other policies (such as export subsidies) have positive 
trade effects. Likewise, if the import-competing and exportables sectors are each 
subject to trade taxes, aggregate NRAs and CTEs may be close to zero even though 
both policies are trade- and welfare-reducing. Furthermore, the welfare effect of a 
policy instrument is related to the square of the individual ad valorem distortion rate, 
which means aggregates of the NRA (or CTE) fail to capture the fact that widely 
different rates of intervention across commodities within a policy instrument group 
have worse welfare effects than if all commodities had similar NRAs and CTEs.   
  Certainly sectoral partial equilibrium or economy-wide computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models can be and are used to estimate trade and welfare effects of 
different policy instruments, drawing on available estimates of NRAs and CTEs by 
instrument. However, such models are intensive in their needs for data and parameter 
(e.g. price elasticity) estimates, and typically they are calibrated to just one past year 
and so are not well suited to timely on-going monitoring or historical analysis of 2 
 
policy developments. For example, Diao, Somwara and Roe (2001) and Hertel and 
Keeney (2006) draw on the GTAP database for 1995 and 2001, respectively. That 
GTAP database, which is updated every three years but typically with a long delay,
1
  In the wake of this latest food price spike, and with the arrival of the new 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database compiled by the World Bank 
(Anderson and Valenzuela 2008) together with new methodological developments by 
Anderson and Neary (2005), it is timely to re-examine the relative contributions of 
different policy instruments to the trade- and welfare-reducing effects of agricultural 
policies across the world.  
 
recognizes the ‘three pillars’ in the WTO agricultural negotiations (import tariffs, 
export subsidies and domestic production subsidies) but it tends to ignore export 
taxes, import subsidies and production taxes. While the latter set may have been 
relatively unimportant in 1995 or 2001, export taxes were re-introduced in Argentina 
at the end of 2001 and export restrictions were used by numerous developing 
countries when international food prices spiked upwards in 2008. Also, new evidence 
suggests changes in those latter measures, especially export taxes, are a significant 
part of the evolving global story of agricultural distortions over the past half century 
(Anderson 2009). 
This paper makes two contributions over and above existing studies. First, it 
offers a new methodological approach for estimating the relative contributions of 
different policy instruments to trade and welfare reductions from agricultural policy. 
Scalar index numbers developed from the Anderson and Neary (2005) family of trade 
restrictiveness indexes are estimated for different policy instruments and then 
compared so as to show their relative contributions. Second, this study applies the 
methodology to the World Bank’s new dataset that allows for the estimation of the 
changing relative contributions over time of a comprehensive set of agricultural 
policy instruments to national, regional and global trade and welfare losses. The 
measures include all forms of border measures (import and export taxes and subsidies 
or the equivalent of non-tariff measures) as well as domestic production and 
consumption taxes and subsidies and farm input taxes and subsidies.   
                                                            
1 See, for example, Narayanan and Walmsley (2008) for the 2004 GTAP database. 3 
 
The indicators estimated in this paper are defined by two descriptors: the 
instrument trade reduction index (ITRI) and the instrument welfare reduction index 
(IWRI). The ITRI (or IWRI) is the ad valorem trade tax rate for a particular policy 
instrument which, if applied uniformly across all tradable agricultural commodities in 
a country, would generate the same reduction in trade volume (or same economic 
welfare loss) as the actual cross-product structure of NRAs and CTEs for that 
instrument in that country. Because the NRAs and CTEs capture the presence of 
domestic measures that can distort just farmer or consumer incentives (in addition to 
trade measures that distort both equally), the ITRI and IWRI are computed from sub-
indexes that herein are called the instrument producer distortion index (IPDI) and the 
instrument consumer distortion index (ICDI).  
The use of ITRI (or IWRI) for computing the relative contribution of different 
policy instruments has the advantage of providing a single theoretically sound partial 
equilibrium indicator of the trade (or welfare) effects of different policy measures that 
is comparable across time and countries. Because the Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008) dataset covers 5 decades (1955 to 2007), the data can indicate trends over time, 
which a comparative static CGE model can only do if it is calibrated to a series of past 
years rather than to just one or a small number of particular years.  
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides the theory for 
deriving the ITRI and IWRI. The theory is first presented for the import-competing 
sector of a country and subsequently extended to the exportable sector. This is 
followed by a description of the World Bank’s Distortions to Agricultural Incentives 
dataset and its breakdown of the NRA and CTE estimates by instrument. The 
following section presents and discusses the estimates of the two indexes by policy 
instrument. Caveats and sensitivity analysis follows, and the final section concludes.  
 
Trade and welfare reduction indexes at the policy instrument level 
 
There is a growing literature that identifies ways to measure the welfare- and trade-
reducing effects of international trade policy in scalar index numbers. This literature 
is traditionally used to overcome aggregation problems across products for a country 4 
 
by using a theoretically sound aggregation procedure that answers precise questions 
regarding the trade and welfare reductions imposed by each country’s price- and 
trade-distorting policies. The literature has developed considerably over the past two 
decades, particularly with advances by Anderson and Neary (summarized and 
extended beyond their 2005 book) and the partial equilibrium simplifications by 
Feenstra (1995).  
  Notwithstanding these advances, there are few series of consistently estimated 
indexes across countries. A prominent exception is the work of Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2009) who, following the approach of Feenstra, estimate a series for 
developing and developed countries. However, they provide estimates only for a 
snapshot in time (the mid-2000s), and their estimates are based only on import 
barriers. Other studies have been country and sector specific, such as an application to 
Mexican agriculture in the late 1980s (Anderson, Bannister and Neary 1995). All 
previous work appears to have focused on constructing index numbers of distortions 
for a single country; and most do not provide them for long time periods, exceptions 
being Irwin (2008) for U.S. import protection policy and Lloyd, Croser and Anderson 
(2010) for global agricultural policy (but not disaggregated by instrument).  
There are several reasons why scalar index numbers are superior to aggregates 
of NRAs and CTEs for comparing contributions of different policy instruments. With 
respect to welfare losses, the IWRI, always positive because it is a mean of order two 
measure (see below), has the desirable attribute that contributions of different 
instruments sum to 100 percent of a country’s welfare loss from its agricultural 
policies. Further, the IWRI correctly takes into account that the welfare effect of a 
policy is related to the square of the price distortion. As for the ITRI, it correctly 
assesses the positive and negative impacts on trade volume of different measures 
(e.g., a positive production subsidy in both an import-competing and exportable sector 
would have offsetting effects on the volume of trade), whereas they could be masked 
in NRA and CTE aggregates. Furthermore, the theory of the ITRI and IWRI allows 
for the differential responses of different products when faced with the same ad 




Indexes for the import-competing sector 
 
The analysis begins with a consideration of scalar indexes for the import-competing 
sector of a small open economy, in which all markets are competitive. The market 
for an import good may be distorted by a tariff and/or other non-tariff border 
measures and/or behind-the-border measures such as domestic producer or 
consumer taxes or subsidies or quantitative restrictions. The ITRI measures the 
effect of an individual policy instrument in the import-competing sector on a 
country’s import volume. The ITRI is the uniform import tariff rate for a particular 
instrument which, if applied to all commodities in place of the disaggregated 
policies, would result in the same reduction in the aggregate volume of imports as 
the actual distortions.  
  Consider the market for one product, good i, which is affected by a 
combination of measures that distort consumer and producer prices.  One type of 
distorting measure is a border measure (such as an import tariff or import subsidy) 
which affects producers and consumers of the good. The distorted domestic price in 
country j from a border measure, pij, is related to the world price, pi*, by the relation 
ij p = pi
*(1 + tij ), where tij is the rate of distortion of the border price in proportional 
terms. Using this relation, the change in imports in the market for good i in country 
j from a border policy instrument, Bij M ∆ ,
2
 
 is given by: 
ij i ij i Bij y p x p M ∆ − ∆ = ∆
* *  
(1)
                ij ij ij i ij ij ij i t dp dy p t dp dx p / /
2 * 2 * − =    
where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied in country j, xij
 
and yij, are 
assumed to be functions of own domestic price alone:  ) ( ij ij ij p x x = and 
) ( ij ij ij p y y = respectively. The neglect of cross-price effects, among other things, 
makes the analysis partial equilibrium. 
                                                            
2 The B subscript is used to denote border measures. The border expressions in this section can always 
be simplified since tij is the same on the production and consumption sides of the economy. However, 
throughout the paper production and consumption are kept separate to allow for domestic production or 
consumption distortions and because the data are available in that form. 6 
 
Strictly speaking, this result holds only for small distortions. In reality, rates 
of distortion to agricultural markets are not small. If, however, it is assumed that the 
demand and supply functions are linear, the reduction in imports is given by 
Equation (1) with  ij ij dp dx /  and  ij ij dp dy /  equal to constants. If the functions are 
not linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss. 
Now consider the same import-competing good to be subject also to 
domestic distortions to producer and consumer prices. For the producers of the 
good, the overall distorted domestic producer price in each country,
P
ij p , is given by 
P
ij p = 
*
i p  (1 + (sij + tij)) where sij is the rate of domestic producer distortion in 
proportional terms. For the consumers of the good, the distorted domestic consumer 
price,
C
ij p , is given by
C
ij p   = 
*
i p
 (1 + (rij + tij)) where rij is the rate of the domestic 




ij p = pij. In 
general, rij ≠ sij ≠ 0. An example, with linear demand and supply curves of this 
situation, is depicted in Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
With both border and domestic distortions, the change in imports in the 
market for good i in country j,  Tij M ∆ , is given by: 
(2)
  ) ( / ) ( /
2 * 2 *
ij ij
P
ij ij i ij ij
C
ij ij i Tij s t dp dy p r t dp dx p M + − + = ∆    
The change in imports from domestic measures alone, Dij M ∆ ,
3
ij i ij i Dij y p x p M ∆ − ∆ = ∆
* *
 is given by 
 where  ij x ∆  in this instance is the change in quantity 
demanded in moving from pij  to 
C
ij p  because of the domestic consumption 
distortion, rij, and  ij y ∆  is the change in quantity supplied in moving from pij  to 
P
ij p  
because of the domestic production distortion, sij. This can be written as:  
(3)  ij
P
ij ij i ij
C
ij ij i Dij s dp dy p r dp dx p M ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = ∆ / /
2 * 2 *      
                                                            
3 The D subscript is used to a denote domestic measures, to distinguish it from the T subscript which is 
used to denote total (i.e. border plus domestic) measures.. 7 
 
With n import-competing products each subject to different levels of 
distortions, the aggregate reduction in imports for country j, in the absence of cross-
price effects, from border and domestic measures separately, can be found by 
summing Equations (1) and (3) across products, respectively:  





ij ij ij i
n
i
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(5)  ∑ ∑
= =














2 * / /  
The aggregate reduction in imports from all measures can be found by 
summing Equation (2) across all import-competing products:  
(6)  ∑ ∑
= =














2 * ) ( / ) ( /  
Setting the result of Equations (4) and (5) equal to the reduction in imports 
from a uniform border measure (Bj) and a uniform domestic measure (Dj) gives:  
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ij p is the price at the intersection of import demand and export supply where 
domestic distortions (additional to border distortions) are taken into account. 
Solving for Bj and Dj gives an index of average tariff rates across commodities 
for all border policy instruments and domestic policy instruments, respectively, since 
what is held constant is the volume of imports at constant prices. For border prices, 
the scalar indexes are given by:   











Bij ij Bj u t R  with ∑ =
i
ij ij i ij ij i Bij dp dx p dp dx p u / / /












Bij ij Bj v t S  with  ∑ =
i
ij ij i ij ij i Bij dp dy p dp dy p v / / /
2 * 2 *  and 
(9d)   ∑ ∑ =
i i
ij ij i ij ij i Bj dp dm p dp dx p a / / /
2 * 2 *
 
  ∑ ∑ =
i i
ij ij i ij ij i Bj dp dm p dp dy p b / / /
2 * 2 *      
Bj is computed as a weighted average of producer and consumer distortions 
(Equation 9a). RBj and SBj are indices of average consumer and producer border 
distortions, each arithmetic means. Since Bj is an index of border measures, the 
distortions being aggregated on both the producer and consumer side are tij values. 
The weights for each commodity to compute RBj and SBj, uBij and vBij,, are proportional 
to each country’s marginal response of domestic production or consumption to 
changes in international trade prices. Each of the weights in (9b) and (9c) can be 
written as functions of, among other things, the domestic price elasticities at either the 
protected trade situation, or the free trade situation: 





ij i ij Bij ij i Bij t x p t x p u + ⋅ + ⋅ = ∑ ρ ρ  and 





ij i ij Bij ij i Bij t y p t y p v + ⋅ + ⋅ = ∑ σ σ
 
where  Bij σ  and  Bij ρ  are elasticities of demand and supply, respectively, at the 
protected trade situation when border measures are in place. 
For domestic policy instruments, the analogous ITRI expressions are given by:  
















ij ij i Dij dp dx p dp dx p u / / /
















ij ij i Dij dp dy p dp dy p v / / /
2 * 2 *  and 





ij ij i Dj dp dm p dp dx p a / / /
2 * 2 *
 9 
 





ij ij i Dj dp dm p dp dy p b / / /
2 * 2 *
 
The index Dj gives the reduction in trade associated with a move from border 
support to border plus domestic support. Analysis of these equations is analogous to 
that for Bj. 
 The weight uDij (or vDij) is proportional to each product’s response to 
domestic consumption (or production) to changes in prices from a border-only 
distortion to a border-plus-domestic distortion. These weights differ from those in 
Equation (9) because they are computed at different prices. Once again, however, the 
weights can be written as functions of domestic price elasticities. 
  Consider now the derivation of the IWRI, which captures the overall effect 
of an individual policy instrument across many commodities on a country’s 
economic welfare. The derivation follows the same steps as the derivation of the 
ITRI. It is assumed that a border measure is first implemented, and this may be 
supplemented by additional domestic protection.
4
(12) 
 The border measure distortion in 
the market for good i in country j creates a welfare loss, LBij. In partial equilibrium 
terms, this loss is given by the sum of the change in producer plus consumer surplus 
net of the tariff revenue. The loss of producer and consumer surplus is given by: 
{ } ij ij ij i ij ij ij i Bij dp dx t p dp dy t p L / ) ( / ) (
2
1 2 * 2 * − =  
where the demand for and the supply of good i in country j are again functions of own 
domestic price alone.   
Again, this result holds only for small distortions. If, however, it is assumed 
that the demand and supply functions are linear, the welfare loss is given by (12) 
with  ij ij dp dx /  and  ij ij dp dy /  equal to constants, in which case welfare losses are 
defined by the familiar triangular-shaped dead-weight loss areas under the demand 
and supply curves for the good in a small open economy. If the functions are not 
linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss.  
                                                            
4 This assumption is made because there is evidence in agriculture that this is what happens in practice. 
The assumption does not have implications for the estimates of the border and domestic ITRIs, but it 
does for IWRIs. For example, in the simple case presented in Figure 1, the assumption implies that the 
rectangular areas bghc and dije are attributed to domestic distortions. The assumption means that the 
IWRI derived for domestic measures is an upper bound.  10 
 
Equation (12) yields the fundamental result that the loss from a tariff is 
proportional to the square of the tariff rate. This holds because the tariff rate 
determines both the price adjustment and the quantity response to this adjustment 
(Harberger 1959).   
With domestic distortions also in place, the welfare loss of producer and 
consumer surplus is given by: 
(13)  { }
C
ij ij ij ij i
P
ij ij ij ij i Tij dp dx r t p dp dy s t p L / )) ( ( / )) ( (
2
1 2 * 2 * + − + =
 
Assuming that domestic measures are imposed as a supplement to border 
measures, the welfare loss from domestic producer and consumer measures is given 
by the difference between Equations (13) and (12).
5
(14) 
 Algebraically:  
{ } ij ij ij i
P
ij ij ij ij i Dij dp dy t p dp dy s t p L / ) ( / )) ( (
2
1 2 * 2 * − + =
 
   
{ } ij ij ij i
C
ij ij ij ij i dp dx t p dp dx r t p / ) ( / )) ( (
2
1 2 * 2 * − + −  
The aggregate welfare loss for a country from the separate border and 
domestic measures, in the assumed absence of cross-price effects, can be found by 
summing Equations (12) and (14) across all import-competing products, which gives 
the left-hand side of Equations (15) and (16) below, respectively. Setting the result 
equal to the welfare loss from a uniform border measure (WBj), and a uniform 
domestic measure (WDj), respectively, gives the following expressions:  
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5 In the example depicted in Figure 1, this is the sum of the two quadrangles bgnc and dmje. 11 
 
Solving for the IWRI border measure (WBj) first gives an expression in a similar form 
to Equation (9):  



























Bij ij Bj v t S
 
and uBij, vBij, aBj and bBj are as given in Equation (9).   
WBj is the uniform tariff that gives the same deadweight loss as that of the 
actual border distortions in country j. It is an appropriately weighted average of the 
level of distortions of consumer and producer prices from border measures. It is a 
mean of order two, which is critically different from the ITRI in Equation (9). As with 
the ITRI, the index is constructed by working with the production and consumption 
sides of the economy separately, and aggregating the production and consumption 
indexes in the last step.  
The IWRI for domestic measures, WDj, is given by a more complex 
expression owing to the need to find the difference in welfare between all measures 
and border measures. As such the expression has four terms, instead of the usual two:  
(18)  )} ( ) {( 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 Dj Dj Dj Dj Dj Di Dj Dj j b S b S a R a R WD ′ − ′ + ′ − ′ =  
 
Indexes for exportable product instruments 
 
Each of the ITRI and IWRI measures can be written also for exportable products. For 
an exportable good, a positive price distortion (such as an export subsidy) reduces 
welfare in the same way as a positive import-competing distortion (such as an import 
tax), but the positive price distortion for an exportable increases trade whereas a 
positive import-competing price distortion reduces trade. That is why it is necessary 
to keep separate track of import-competing and exporting products for the purpose of 
estimating ITRIs and IWRIs.  12 
 
The ITRI for border measures for exportable products is the same as that for 
Equation (9) where there are i exportable products and  BjM R  and  BjM S  are replaced 
by:   




















Bij ij BjX v t S
1
 
As in the previous section, when estimating indexes for exporting products, 
they are estimated separately for producers and consumers and aggregated only in the 
last step. The aggregates in Equation (19) are the weighted average levels of 
distortions to consumer and producer prices for exportable products, respectively, 
with weights uBij and v Bij given in Equation (9b) and (9c). Importantly, distortions to 
exportable products enter Equation (19) as negative values. This is because whilst a 
lowering of tij in the import-competing sector reduces the reduction index, a lowering 
of tij in the exporting sector increases it.  
The ITRI measure Bj can be regarded as the country j export tax which, if 
applied uniformly across all products, would give the same reduction in trade as the 
combination of individual border measures distorting consumer and producer prices 
in the exporting sector.  
The ITRI for domestic measures, and the IWRI for border and domestic 
measures separately, can each be adapted to the exportables sector from the import-
competing sector expressions in an analogous way, and the exporting instrument 
indexes have the same properties as the indexes for the import-competing 
instruments.  
In the empirical section of the paper below, ITRIs and IWRIs can be 
reported not only at the level of the 4 sub-indexes developed above, Dj, Bj, WDj and 
WBj, but they can also be reported individually for positive or negative distortionary 
measures. This means, for example, that separate indexes can be reported for the 
trade- and welfare-reducing effects of import taxes, import subsidies, export taxes, 
export subsidies, and domestic producer and consumer taxes and subsidies on 
outputs or inputs.  13 
 
IWRIs and ITRIs can be aggregated across countries using as weights an 
average of each country’s value of production and consumption at undistorted 
prices. In this paper, because the focus is on the relative contribution of different 
instruments to reductions in trade and welfare, each ITRI and IWRI index on the 
production (consumption) side of a country’s economy is converted to a constant 
dollar value of production (or consumption) index by multiplying the ad valorem 
index by the value of production (or consumption) at undistorted prices for that 
instrument group. The dollar values are divided by the country’s overall value of 
production (or consumption) of all covered tradable goods to recover what can be 
considered as a decomposition of an overall country-level TRI or WRI.   
 
Simplifying assumptions to estimate the indices 
 
In Equation (11) it is shown that the weights for the ITRI and IWRI can be written 
as functions of, among other things, the domestic price elasticities at either the 
protected trade situation or the free trade situation. In the absence of estimates of 
domestic demand and supply elasticities, a simplifying assumption can be made that 
the domestic price elasticities of supply are equal across products for a particular 
country, and likewise domestic price elasticities of demand are equal across 
products for a particular country. In that case, the elasticities in the numerator and 
denominator of Equation (11) cancel. RBj (or S Bj) can therefore be found by 
aggregating the change in consumer (or producer) prices across commodities, using 
as weights shares of each commodity’s domestic value of consumption (or 
production) at undistorted prices.   
A further necessary step in estimating Bj in Equation (9a) requires an 
assumption about the weights aBj and bBj. The weight aBj (or bBj) is proportional to the 
ratio of the marginal response of domestic demand (or supply) to a price change from 
border distortions relative to the marginal response of imports to the same price 14 
 
change. If one is willing to assume that the marginal responses of supply and demand 
to a price change are the same in aggregate, then a=b=0.5.
6
Thus from a practical viewpoint, Bj can be computed with all the information 
available for calculating NRAs and CTEs (or the PSEs and CSEs generated by the 
OECD), provided two assumptions are made: (1) equal domestic price elasticities of 
supply across products within a country (and the same for domestic price elasticities 
of demand); and (2) equal responsiveness of aggregate supply and demand to price 
changes for the set of products of concern for an economy. Ideally policy analysts 
would incorporate elasticity estimates and information on responsiveness of aggregate 
supply and demand where available. However, where they are not available, estimates 
of the indices Bj, RBj and SBj are nonetheless superior to existing widely-used 
agricultural policy measures of trade distortions. Analogous assumptions can be made 
for the domestic measures derived in this paper. 
   
 
The Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database  
 
A new database (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008), generated by the World Bank’s 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives research project using a methodology 
summarized in Anderson et al. (2008), provides a timely opportunity to estimate 
indexes of the trade- and welfare-reducing effects of different policy instruments. 
The database includes estimates of different agricultural policy instruments for 75 
countries that together account for over 90 percent of the world’s population, 
farmers, agricultural GDP and total GDP. The estimates in the database are 
consistent estimates of annual NRAs and CTEs over the years 1955 to 2007. The 
country coverage is most complete for the years 1960 to 2004 so only that period is 
reported in this manuscript. The series contains data at the commodity level for a 
subset of agricultural products (called covered products) that account for around 70 
percent of total agricultural production in each of the 75 countries.  
                                                            
6 With linear demand and supply curves for a country’s economy, this equates to an assumption that the 
aggregate demand and supply curves have the same slope, so that each side of the economy contributes 
equally to the ITRI.  15 
 
  The range of measures included in those NRA and CTE estimates is wide. 
By calculating domestic-to-border price ratios, the overall estimates include the 
price effects of all tariff and non-tariff trade measures (positive or negative), plus 
any domestic price measures (positive or negative), plus an adjustment for the 
output-price equivalent of direct interventions in farm input markets. Where 
multiple exchange rates operate, estimates of the import or export tax equivalents of 
that distortion are included as well. The database is especially well suited to the 
analysis in this paper because it separately identifies each of the price effects of the 
different policy instruments referred to above.    
  The most aggregated summaries of NRA and CTE estimates for 
covered products for developing and high income countries are provided in Figure 
2. Figure 2a supports the widely held view that developing country governments 
had in place agricultural policies that effectively taxed their farmers through to the 
1980s, and that the extent of those disincentives has lessened since then. Indeed 
since the mid-1990s those farmers have enjoyed slightly positive assistance on 
average. Figure 2b shows the growth of agricultural protection in high-income 
countries since the 1960s and its reversal on average after the 1980s. Consumers 
have experienced changes similar to producers in recent years: in developing 
countries consumers were effectively subsidized for most of the last 50 years 
although that has lessened since the 1990s, while in high-income countries the 
implicit taxation of consumers from agricultural support rose until the late 1980s 
but has fallen since then.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 show the trends in NRAs and CTEs, respectively, for the four 
studied regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe’s transition economies. 
On the production side, Africa is where there has been the least tendency to reduce 
the taxing of farmers and subsidizing of consumers of farm products. Indeed its 
average NRA has been negative in all 5-year periods except the mid-1980s when 
international prices of farm products reached an all-time low in real terms. By 
contrast, for both Asia and Latin America their NRAs crossed over from negative to 
positive after the 1980s, while in Europe’s transition economies assistance to 
farmers has trended upward following the initial shock in the early 1990s. In all 16 
 
four regions, agricultural policies have almost always involved consumer 
subsidization. Since the 1980s, however, food consumer subsidization in Asia, 
Latin America and Europe’s transition economies has gradually disappeared and 
been replaced by a small degree of taxation.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Assistance to import-competing farmers is typically well above that for the 
export producers (Table 1), and conversely for consumers of farm products. This 
means there is an anti-trade bias in the structure of agricultural distortions. In the case 
of developing countries where the import-competing NRA is positive and the NRA 
for exportables is negative, the two tend to offset each other such that the overall 
sectoral NRA is close to zero. Such a sectoral average can thus be misleading as an 
indication of the extent of distortion within the sector. It can also be misleading when 
comparing across countries that have varying degrees of dispersion in their NRAs for 
different farm industries.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Of most relevance for this paper is the instrument level NRA and CTE data. 
Table 2 summarizes the contributions of different policy measures to the overall 
estimated NRAs and CTEs for the two periods 1981-84 and 2000-04. It show that 
trade measures always account for the largest share of the total NRA for both 
developing and high-income countries, and even more so for the total CTE because 
direct domestic consumer subsidies/taxes, as distinct from the indirect ones provided 
by border measures, are relatively rare. The dominance of border measures in both 
CTEs and NRAs ensures that the two price distortion indicators are highly correlated. 
For all focus countries, covered products and available years in the panel set, the 
coefficient of correlation between NRAs and CTEs is 0.93.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The Distortions to Agricultural Incentives database also includes measures of 
so-called decoupled support and other non-product-specific assistance. These 
measures account for one-third of the aggregate NRA of all focus countries in 2000–
04, and even more in high-income countries. Because decoupled payments and non-
product-specific supports are not reported at the product level in the database, they are 
not captured in the ITRI and IWRI estimates. However, they are clearly important for 
the overall story of agricultural policy — especially in high-income countries where 17 
 
there has been a move to forms of support decoupled from production in recent 
decades – and so an attempt is made in the Caveat section below to gauge the 
potential contribution of these measures. 
    
Estimates of the instrument indexes 
     
The results from estimation of ITRIs and IWRIs are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 for 
the main regions of the world. The first thing to notice is that border measures 
dominate in terms of the trade- and welfare-reducing effects of agricultural policies in 
all regions being studied. This comes partly from the dominance of border measures 
in the NRA/CTE estimates, but also from the fact that a border measure affects both 
sides of the market whereas a domestic measure affects only one side (production or 
consumption).  
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Within border measures, import taxes are the most significant reducer of 
global trade, followed by export taxes which were especially prominent in 
developing countries through to the 1980s (Figure 4). The other two categories of 
border measures (export and import subsidies) expand trade, but the TRI estimates 
for these instruments are at such low levels that they have little offsetting impact on 
the trade-reducing effects of the trade-taxing border measures.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Comparing the ITRI results to those reported in Table 2 (contributions to the 
aggregate NRA and CTE from different policy instruments) highlights the usefulness 
of the TRI approach: in the NRA/CTE aggregates, the two most distorting policies 
(import taxes and export taxes) more or less offset one another, while for the ITRI 
they are reinforcing.    
As for relative contributions to the aggregate IWRI, border measures 
dominate in all time periods, accounting for between 86 percent (1965-69) and 96 
percent (1980-84) of global welfare losses (Table 4). Import taxes contribute most 18 
 
to the reduction in global welfare due to border measures, followed by developing 
countries’ export taxes (Figure 5c). For the developing country group, export taxes 
were the most significant contributor to welfare losses prior to the 1990s (Figure 
5a), but their relative importance has fallen in all regions since then (Table 4).  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
A comparison of the IWRI results in Table 4 with those in Table 2 for NRA 
and CTE aggregates reveals the usefulness of the IWRI method. Take import taxes in 
2000–04, for example: they account for slightly more than 100 percent of border 
measure NRAs and CTEs globally but, according to the IWRI, those taxes account for 
around only three-quarters of the global welfare loss from all border measures.  
The global border measure IWRI peaked for the world in 1985–89, after 
which it nearly halved to just over 30 percent by 2000–04. Table 5 reveals the relative 
contributions of each of the four border measures to this overall reduction, for each of 
the studied regions and globally. Import and export taxes contribute just over and a 
little under half of the overall global reduction, respectively. For developing countries, 
however, the fall was driven overwhelmingly by falls in export taxes: they account for 
86 percent of their IWRI reduction. This dramatic result receives no comment in the 
previous studies cited at the start of this paper, not only because they include no time 
series but also because they ignore export taxes (as well as production taxes and 
import subsidies).
7
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  
  Finally, annual time series reveal what happens to the relative contributions of 
different policies when international prices for farm products spike up or down. 
Insulation of domestic markets from such shocks, by varying border trade restrictions, 
is a common practice in both developing and high-income countries. The net effect is 
clear in Figure 5: when international prices spike up, as in 1973–74, the contribution 
of import tariffs falls dramatically but the contribution of export taxes rises, and 
conversely when international prices collapse, as in 1986.   
                                                            
7 Dioa, Somwaru and Roe (2001, p 37) find 89 percent of their cost of agricultural policies comes from 
import tariffs (market access), 10 percent from domestic producer support and 1 percent from export 
subsidies. Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006) suggest 93 percent of the global cost of agricultural 
import protection and subsidies is due to tariffs, the costs of domestic support measures are around 5 





A number of important caveats are worth mentioning. Perhaps the most important 
caveat has to do with the simplifying assumptions about elasticities. For lack of a 
comprehensive set of country- and commodity-specific own-price elasticity estimates, 
it is assumed above that the own-price elasticity of supply (and also of demand) 
within a country is the same for each farm product. The effect of this assumption on 
the ITRI and IWRI estimates is likely to be small because those indexes draw on the 
production assistance and consumption tax indexes which each has three terms (e.g., 
for the PAI they are the production-weighted average price distortion, its variance, 
and its covariance with the output price elasticity of supply) and the elasticity appears 
only in the third term. We also ignore cross-price effects, as the algebra becomes far 
more complex without that assumption. And in the aggregation of country producer 
and consumer distortion indexes, we assume the aggregate marginal response of 
domestic demand to a price change is the same as the aggregate marginal response of 
domestic supply. To explore this last assumption we altered the weights on 
consumption and production (the a and b terms in the ITRI and IWRI formulae, 
respectively); we found this left the estimates for the border ITRI and IWRI almost 
unchanged at the aggregate level for all countries. This is not surprising given the 
high correlation between the IPDI and ICDI (and equivalents for the ITRI) for border 
distortions.  
  Another caveat is that the ITRI and IWRI do not include forms of support that 
are not given at the product level. In the Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) database, 
non-product-specific (NPS) assistance in some countries is a significant component of 
overall agricultural sector distortion rate (see Table 2). NPS assistance is reported 
there in three forms: general non-product-specific assistance, those farm input 
subsidies for high-income countries that are not attributed at the product level in the 
database, and so-called decoupled payments. Recalling that the ITRI (or IWRI) is 
defined as the ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly across all tradable 
agricultural commodities in a country, would generate the same reduction in trade (or 
economic welfare) as the actual cross-product structure of NRAs and CTEs for that 20 
 
country, it is possible to make a simple assumption to incorporate NPS measures. If 
one assumes 100 percent pass-through of NPS distortions to producer prices, the 
upper bound of the contribution of NPS support can be derived by attributing the 
NRA from NPS equally to the ad valorem NRA for each covered product. When this 
is done, it makes little difference to the estimated indexes for developing countries, 
while for high-income countries it reduces the decline in the estimated WRI (but by a 
smaller degree than it reduces the decline in the NRA, because the NRA contributions 
so attributed to decoupled payments have zero variance across commodities and so 
reduce the variance in overall NRAs). It provides an approximate guide to the 
increased relative importance of decoupled payments and non-product-specific 
support to the overall WRI for high-income countries (Figure 6)
8
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 




This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on trade and welfare 
reduction indexes. On the theory side, it develops a method of calculating trade and 
welfare reduction indexes for individual policy instruments from estimates of the rates 
of distortions of producer and consumer prices. The main contribution is to show that, 
provided one is willing to make simplifying assumptions about price elasticities, it is 
possible to use the same data as existing NRAs/CTEs (or PSEs/CSEs) indicators to 
estimate superior measures of the relative contribution of different policies to global 
reductions in trade and welfare. Empirically, the paper’s main contribution is to apply 
the methodology to generate a time series of indexes for agricultural products that are 
well-grounded in trade theory and answer precise questions about the trade- and 
welfare-reducing effects of different policy instruments. The paper estimates these 
contributions for a greater set of policy instruments than previous studies. Further, the 
indexes are generated for 75 developed and developing countries over the past half 
century. They are useful as inputs into trade negotiations and for monitoring national 
                                                            
8 To better capture the welfare effects of these measures further research is needed. Serra, Zilberman, 
Goodwin and Featherstone (2006) find, for example, that decoupled payments affect input use and 
output mean and variance — which have potential welfare effects that may be non-trivial. 21 
 
policy developments and making cross-country comparisons of their trade and welfare 
effects.  
The most significant result empirically is the importance of export taxes prior 
to the 1990s and their contribution to the fall in the global trade- and welfare-
restrictiveness of agricultural policies over the past two decades. Previous studies 
aimed at estimating the relative contributions of different policy instruments to global 
welfare reduction ignore export taxes (and import subsidies and production taxes) 
altogether, and find that import taxes contributed as much as 85 percent of the 
reduction to global farm trade and 93 percent of global welfare losses from 
agricultural policies in 2001. By contrast, this paper finds that export taxes played a 
significant role in the aggregate reduction of global trade and welfare (contributing as 
much as one-third in some time periods). It is likely they will continue to do so when 
international food prices rise — as indeed happened in 2008. We also find that export 
taxes have contributed substantially to the almost halving of the global WRI (for 
border measures) from its peak in the latter 1980s. Globally import and export taxes 
each contributed roughly half to the decline in the IWRI for border measures. For the 
most recent period reported above (2000-04), import taxes are certainly by far the 
most dominant instrument reducing global agricultural trade and associated economic 
welfare, a result that reinforces the conclusions of earlier studies that import market 
access is the most important of the ‘pillars’ being negotiated in the agricultural part of 
the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda. But the widespread re-emergence of food 
export taxes in 2008 is a reminder that those measures too need to be disciplined by 
the WTO if it is to fulfill its welfare-enhancing role of reducing uncertainty in 
international trade – hence the importance of including such instruments in the 
estimation of TRIs and WRIs.  
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Figure 1: Representation of the import-competing agricultural sector of a small 
open economy with a border tax and a domestic consumer tax and a domestic 
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to farmers and consumer tax equivalents in 
high-income and developing countries, all covered farm products, 1960 to 
2007 
(percent, averaged using weights based on gross value of production or consumption at undistorted 
prices) 
(a)  Nominal rates of assistance 
 
(b) Consumer tax equivalents 
 
 Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 27 
 
  
Figure 3: Nominal rate of assistance to farmers and consumer tax equivalents in 
developing country regions and in Europe’s transition economies (ECA), all covered 
farm products, 1960 to 2007  
(percent, averaged using weights based on the gross value of production or consumption at undistorted 
prices) 
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Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 28 
 
Figure 4: Relative contributions of different border policy instruments to trade 
reduction from agricultural policies (ITRI), 1960 to 2004  
(percent) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 29 
 
Figure 5: Relative contributions of different border policy instruments to welfare 
reduction from agricultural policies (IWRI), 1960 to 2004  
(percent) 
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Figure 5 (continued): Relative contributions of different border policy instruments to 
welfare reduction from agricultural policies (IWRI), 1960 to 2004  
(percent) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Figure 6: Relative contributions to welfare reduction from agricultural policies 
(IWRI) of different policy instruments including non-product-specific support
a, high-








































Source: Authors’ calculations using data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
 
 
a Both ‘decoupled’ measures plus other non-product-specific support.32 
 
Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance
a for import-competing, exportable and all farm products, by region and globally, 1960 to 2004       (percent) 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04 
Covered import-competing products                 
Africa  12  4  -7  8  8  65  2  7  3 
Asia  4  34  26  31  21  45  28  28  35 
Latin America  20  3  -4  2  10  4  17  9  19 
All developing countries  11  26  17  23  17  39  22  22  28 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  31  34  34 
High-income countries  54  59  42  56  70  84  73  64  60 
World  48  50  37  46  46  66  51  43  44 
Covered exportables                   
Africa  -31  -39  -44  -45  -36  -36  -39  -26  -28 
Asia  -13  -26  -20  -25  -44  -39  -19  -4  0 
Latin America  -23  -17  -30  -26  -27  -24  -9  -3  -4 
All developing countries  -25  -29  -29  -30  -40  -37  -19  -5  -3 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  -4  -1  0 
High-income countries  4  10  8  7  8  17  13  6  5 
World  -2  -4  -7  -11  -24  -21  -8  -1  0 
All covered farm products
b                   
Africa  -13  -18  -22  -20  -12  1  -12  -7  -9 
Asia  -3  3  0  0  -21  -15  -5  6  10 
Latin America  -13  -13  -25  -20  -15  -14  1  1  3 
All developing countries  -9  -5  -9  -8  -20  -13  -5  4  7 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  7  15  15 
High-income countries  32  39  29  36  43  58  49  36  32 
World  24  24  15  18  6  16  18  16  16 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
a Weighted using the value of production at undistorted prices.  
b Includes nontradables.   
d Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those years 
were the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69, and that the gross value of production in those 
missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
This NRA assumption is conservative in the sense that for both countries the average NRA was probably even lower in earlier years.            33 
 
Table 2: Contributions to total agricultural NRA and CTE from different policy instruments,




(a) Nominal Rates of Assistance
















Import tax equivalent  6  34  18  8  24  14 
Export subsidies  1  2  2  1  1  2 
Export tax equivalent  -20  0  -13  -3  0  -2 
Import subsidy equivalent  -2  0  -2  -1  0  -1 
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -15  36  5  5  25  13 
Domestic measures             
Production subsidies  1  2  1  1  1  1 
Production taxes  -5  0  -3  -1  0  -1 
farm input net subsidies  1  3  2  2  2  2 
Non-product-specific (NPS) assistance except to inputs  1  1  1  2  5  3 
ALL DOMESTIC PRODUCTION MEASURES  -2  6  1  4  8  5 
             
‘Decoupled’ payments to farm households  0  6  2  0  11  4 
TOTAL NRA (including NPS and decoupled payments)  -17  48  8  9  44  22 
             
Producer subsidy equivalent, in real 2000 US$ billion  -113  223  99  58  173  250 
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Table 2 (continued): Contributions to total agricultural NRA and CTE from different policy instruments,




(b) Consumer Tax Equivalents
























   
Import tax equivalent  10  46  24  10  32  19 
   
Export subsidies  1  2  1  1  1  2 
   
Export tax equivalent  -22  0  -13  -2  0  -2 
   
Import subsidy equivalent  -3  0  -2  -1  0  -1 
   
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -14  48  10  8  33  18 
 
Domestic measures 




   
Consumption subsidies  -1  0  -1  -1  -6  -3 
   
Consumption taxes  0  0  0  1  0  1 
   
ALL DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION MEASURES  -1  0  -1  0  -6  -2 
 
TOTAL CTE (covered farm products only)  -15  48  9  8  27  16 





Consumer tax equivalent, in real 2000 US$ billion  -67  146  73  34  79  125 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).
 
a In the absence of data, it is assumed the share of input tax/subsidy, domestic production tax/subsidy and border tax/subsidy payments for non-
covered farm products are the same as those for covered farm products. The first period begins in 1981 because that was the first year for which 
estimates for China are available. 
b All entries have been generated by dividing the producer subsidy equivalent of all (including NPS and ‘decoupled’) measures by the total 
agricultural sector’s gross production valued at undistorted prices.  
c All entries have been generated by dividing the consumer tax equivalent of all measures by the total consumption value (at the farmgate level, 
valued at undistorted prices). 35 
 
Table 3: Contributions to Trade Reduction Index for covered products by different policy instruments,
a by region,
b 1980-84 and 2000–04 
(percent) 
(a) Production side of economy 
                          1980-84 
 
              2000-04 
   Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World     Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World 
All measures  24  37  21  33  35  33     16  10  7  10  27  17 
Border measures  22  33  20  30  35  32 
 
13  9  7  9  28  17 
   Export tax  24  27  21  26  0  14 
 
15  2  6  3  0  2 
   Export subsidy  -4  -1  -1  -1  -3  -2 
 
-3  -1  -3  -2  -1  -2 
   Import tax  10  9  6  8  38  22 
 
7  10  5  9  29  17 
   Import subsidy  -8  -2  -5  -3  -1  -2 
 
-6  -1  -2  -1  0  -1 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  2  4  1  3  0  1 
 
3  1  0  1  -1  0 
   Production tax on output  2  3  0  2  0  1 
 
3  1  0  1  0  0 
   Production subsidy on output  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  0  0  -1  0 
   Farm input net subsidies  0  0  1  1  0  0 
 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
(b) Consumption side of economy 
   Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World     Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World 
All measures  12  35  16  29  41  34     12  11  11  11  30  19 
Border measures  12  34  16  29  41  34 
 
11  11  10  11  31  20 
   Export tax  14  26  15  23  0  12 
 
11  1  4  3  0  2 
   Export subsidy  -3  -1  -1  -1  -2  -1 
 
-2  -1  -2  -1  -1  -2 
   Import tax  13  11  8  11  43  25 
 
9  12  11  11  33  21 
   Import subsidy  -12  -3  -7  -4  -1  -3 
 
-6  -1  -2  -1  0  -1 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  1  0  -1  -1 
   Consumption tax  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  2  0  0  0 
   Consumption subsidy  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  -2  0  -1  -1 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 36 
 
a. Each instrument share is computed in the following two steps: (1) ITRI indices are converted to constant 2000 $US by multiplying the index 
by the average value of production or consumption for that instrument group at the country level; (2) each instrument dollar amount index is 
divided by the country average value of production or consumption. The measures in the table — which are like a weighted average of an overall 
regional TRI — therefore reflect both the absolute size of the index for each policy instrument and the relative importance of that policy 
instrument in the region.   
b. Asia excludes Japan; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; DCs = developing countries; HIC = high-income countries; and World 
includes Europe’s transition economies for 200-04 (not shown separately) but not for 1980-84.37 
 
Table 4: Contributions to Welfare Reduction Index for covered products by different policy instruments,
a by region,
 b 1980-84 and 2000–04 
(percent) 
(a) Production side of economy 
                          1980-84 
 
              2000-04 
   Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World     Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World 
All measures  54  61  46  58  64  60 
 
38  20  25  23  53  36 
Border measures  48  44  38  43  61  51     33  17  18  19  45  31 
   Export tax  25  29  23  28  0  15 
 
16  2  7  4  0  3 
   Export subsidy  4  1  1  1  4  2 
 
3  3  3  3  4  4 
   Import tax  11  12  7  11  57  31 
 
8  12  7  11  41  23 
   Import subsidy  8  2  6  4  1  3 
 
6  1  2  1  0  1 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  6  17  8  14  2  9     5  3  7  4  7  5 
   Production tax on output  5  15  1  12  0  6 
 
4  1  2  1  1  1 
   Production subsidy on output  1  0  1  0  2  1 
 
0  0  2  1  6  3 
   Farm input net subsidies  0  1  7  2  0  1     0  2  3  2  0  1 
(b) Consumption side of economy 
   Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World     Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HIC  World 
All measures  47  47  39  45  69  55 
 
33  21  22  22  55  37 
Border measures  46  41  37  40  69  53     32  20  22  21  53  36 
   Export tax  14  25  17  23  0  13 
 
12  2  4  3  0  2 
   Export subsidy  3  1  1  1  3  2 
 
2  3  3  3  3  3 
   Import tax  15  13  11  13  65  35 
 
11  15  13  14  50  29 
   Import subsidy  13  2  8  4  1  3 
 
7  1  2  1  0  1 
Domestic taxes & subsidies  1  6  2  5  0  3     1  2  0  1  1  1 
   Consumption tax  1  6  2  5  0  3 
 
1  2  0  1  1  1 
   Consumption subsidy  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
0  0  0  0  0  0 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 38 
 
a. Each instrument share is computed in the following two steps: (1) IWRI indices are converted to constant 2000 $US billions by multiplying 
the index by the average value of production or consumption for that instrument group at the country level; (2) each instrument dollar amount 
index is divided by the country average value of production or consumption. The measures in the table — which are like a weighted average of 
an overall regional WRI — therefore reflect both the absolute size of the index for each policy instrument and the relative importance of that 
policy instrument in the region. 
b. Asia excludes Japan; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; DCs = developing countries; HIC = high-income countries; and World 
includes Europe’s transition economies for 200-04 (not shown separately) but not for 1980-84.39 
 
Table 5: Contributions of different policy instruments to the decline in the border policy 
component of the agricultural Welfare Reduction Index,





   Africa  Asia  LAC  DCs  HICs  World 
   Export tax  21  94  93  86  0  42 
   Export subsidy  8  -4  -10  -3  10  2 
   Import tax  79  9  -17  15  88  54 
   Import subsidy  -8  1  34  2  1  2 
All border 
measures  100  100  100  100  100  100 
               
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
 
a. Contributions are computed using the value of the IWRI in constant 2000 $US billions. 
 
 
 